Webboard : (TD-2) 3rd. Experimental Satellite Launch Flight Test
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Unha-2, Taep'o-dong -2

(TD-2) 3rd. Experimental Satellite Launch Flight Test

 

The Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province, Pongdong-ni, or Dongchong-ri or Tongch'ang-dong West Coast Facilities (25)

 

6-4/10-26-2009/3-16-31 thru, 4-9-2012

Rev. 7

By C. P. Vick, 2012

Senior Technical & Space Policy Analyst

Globalsecurity.org

 

On April 12, 2012, North Korea launched a TaepoDong-2 missile. The missile was tracked on a southerly launch over the Yellow Sea. The first stage was assessed by US NORTHCOM to have fallen into the sea 102.5 miles west of Seoul, South Korea; while the missile's other two stages were assessed to have failed and no debris fell on land


Introduction

Iran and North Korea are the quid pro quo near abroad allies of China that is guilty of supporting their activities thus we can expect little support from China on the nuclear issues. China does not have our wellbeing in mind. Their Doctrine says they will replace us on the world stage in a self-fulfilling philosophy. The technology transfer from China PRC to Iran and North Korea a fraternal communist ally has been documented by impeccable human intelligence HUMINT reports.

“Based on known previous (trends) practices North Korea, if negotiations fail, as expected is preparing a space booster ballistic missile flight test and or nuclear test for both North Korea and Iran though the evidence is thin right now it is expected sometime in 2012 as a part of the present fiscal Five Year Plan (FYP) and the dear leader’s son leadership. Static test firings of the engines have already been accomplished in [(October, 2010 on the Dongchang-ri static stand site of the new launch infrastructure (1)]….which is right on Time.” (2) “This comes from both US and South Korean personnel reflecting the FYP cycle (predictability whether understood or not).” (2) This was no hurry up launch decision that was over five years in the planning stages.

[Also at that time in July 2011 it was reported that the Dongchang-ri launch facilities infrastructure was very nearly completed.] (3) Subsequently in July 2011 it was reported by The Chosun Ilbo, quoting South Korean government sources, that North Korea was laying railroad tracks between the Tongchang-ri railroad station and the launch infrastructure (4)

As if on “Q” the DPRK main radio Station announced what had apparently been precisely timed for the present Five Year Plan actual schedule.

“ Pyongyang, March 16–KCNA--The DPRK is to launch a working satellite, Kwangmyongsong-3, (Bright Shining Star) manufactured by itself with indigenous technology to mark the 100th birth anniversary of President Kim II Sung.

A spokesman for the Korean Committee for Space Technology said this in a statement Friday.

After successfully launching two experimental satellites, DPRK scientists and technicians have steadily conducted scientific researches to develop and utilize working satellites indispensable for the country's economic development in line with the government's policy for space development and peaceful use.

Through the researches they have made a drastic progress in the field of space science and technology and laid solid material and technological foundations for working satellite launches and operation.

Kwangmyongsong-3, a polar-orbiting earth observation satellite, will be blasted off southward from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province between April 12 and 16, lifted by carrier rocket Unha-3.

A safe flight orbit has been chosen so that carrier rocket debris to be generated during the flight would not have any impact on neighboring countries.

The DPRK will strictly abide by relevant international regulations and usage concerning the launch of scientific and technological satellites for peaceful purposes and ensure maximum transparency, thereby contributing to promoting international trust and cooperation in the field of space scientific researches and satellite launches.

The upcoming launch will greatly encourage the army and people of the DPRK in the building of a thriving nation and will offer an important occasion of putting the country's technology of space use for peaceful purposes on a higher stage."(5)

This included information for watch, warning reports provided by the DPRK to the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the International Telecommunications Union and others as required by international law.

The data presently available seems to indicate first stage is to impact 140 Km off the coast of Byeonsan, South Korea that is 20 km wide and 250 km long and second stage and shroud elements impact 190 km well east of the Luzon Island of the Philippines over the Philippines trench region impact zone of 160 km wide and some 800 km long all over international waters between 3,150-3,950 km from the launch site. Payload and third stage shrouds should impact about 3,200 km down range. The first stage is expected to separate at an altitude of 250-300 km with impact in the sea about 280-450 km from the launch pad site at 39.660107 N, 124.7053203 E . The waters off the South Korean coast have a depth of about 40 meters making it possible for South Korea to recover from the ocean floor bed the surviving broken up elements of the Unha-2, 3 booster’s first stage. That precise impact region will be defined by the two South Korean Aegis–class destroyer’s radar’s and US surveillance means such as surveillance ships and aircraft in addition to sonar equipped ships of both navy’s. (6)

Hypothetical southern missile flyout corridor.
Credit: Globalsecurity.org and GoogleEarth.

 

Based on the North Korean data supplied to the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the International Telecommunications Union and others as required by international law the following information applies. (7, 8)

 

Launch of the Kwangmyongsong-3, a polar-orbiting earth observation satellite is to be launched

Time: 07:00 ~ 12:00 Daily Local Time. [2200-0300 GMT]

Place of launch: The West Sea Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province between April 12 and 16, 2012

Impact Zones:

First stage impact zone:

35 degrees 12’ 25” N 124 degrees 52’ 23” E

35 degrees 12’ 13” N 124 degrees 34’ 34” E

35 degrees 55’ 10” N 124 degrees 50’ 25” E

35 degrees 55’ 20” N 124 degrees 32’ 10” E

Second stage & Shrouds impact zone:

15 degrees 8’ 19” N 124 degrees 46’ 15” E

15 degrees 09’ 35” N 123 degrees 45’ 27” E

19 degrees 23” 08” N 124 degrees 45’ 13” E

19 degrees 24’ 32” N ` 123 degrees 54’ 26” E

 

Potential Mission Payloads Question

North Korea can fly out of this Tongch'ang-dong facility to polar orbit inclined just west of a due south inclination for an imaging/ERTS/RECSAT or weather imaging satellite launch or for a limited range LRICBM test without going over other countries territory. While a near due east flight out of Musudan-ni would be for a communications satellite probably for store dump military communications traffic or could be for an LRICBM test flight. This is the fourth satellite launch attempt by the DPRK. In truth “Earth observation satellite” description can cover a multitude of mission including Earth resources, mapping imagery, reconnaissance photo imaging and or radar imaging operations as well as weather in low earth polar orbit. A polar orbit satellite is not an advanced geostationary meteorological satellite which is launched from an equatorial orbit not polar orbit.

 

Mission Data

On March 28, 2012 h KCNA the official North Korean News Agency interviewed the vice director of the Space Development Department of the Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST) answering the critical questions on the Earth observation satellites expected orbit, missions and payload mass. The two year useful life 100 kilogram satellite has multiple missions primarily built around ERTS earth resources satellite technology as well as the added benefit of meteorological weather forecasting. The rectangular box satellite sports four solar array panels for deployment with several external sensors on top and five antennas. (29)

It is to be launched into a polar solar (Sun) synchronous orbit at 500km high altitude with an inclination of 97.40 degrees with an orbital period of 94.737 minutes. (9) However this may in fact be incorrect based on new analysis developed. (See below.) The DPRK is now emphasizing that it is a small earth observation polar orbiting satellite probably launched at 88,7 degrees inclination while a sun-synchronouus launch would be at the previous indicated inclination which is believed to be incorrect.

 

 Satellite data Transmission

The satellite will broad cast its data in the UHF, radio band while its video will be in the X-band according to the International Telecommunications Union. The UHF band utilizes frequencies in the 300MHz –to 3 GHz range with several frequency ranges reserved for satellite use. The X-band covers frequencies in the 7GHz to 12 GHz range for satellites.

 

Report: Suggest the DPRK Satellite Mission is Not as Previously Portrayed

Reply:Ted Molczan: "RE: North Korea satellite: NOTAMs inconsistent with claimed sun-synchronous orbit"

http://satobs.org/seesat/Apr-2012/0011.html

North Korea satellite: NOTAMs inconsistent with claimed sun-synchronous orbit

From: Ted Molczan (ssl3molcz@rogers.com)
Date: Mon Apr 02 2012 - 02:46:09 UTC

North Korea claims that its upcoming rocket launch will place a satellite in a 500 km, sun-synchronous orbit:

http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201203/news28/20120328-40ee.html

"It weighs 100kg and will circle along the solar synchronous orbit at 500km high altitude."

The sun-synchronous claim is inconsistent with the NOTAM coordinates North Korea has issued for the impact zone of the rocket's two stages:

NAVAREA NO.12-0174 Date:2012/03/19 12 UTC

YELLOW SEA AND NORTH PACIFIC, LUZON.

ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FROM NORTH

KOREA VIA IMO, ROCKET LAUNCHING.

IMPACT HOUR 2200Z TO 0300Z COMMENCING

DAILY 11 TO 15 APR.

IMPACT AREAS BOUNDED BY

A. 35-12-25N 124-52-23E

35-12-13N 124-30-34E

35-55-20N 124-32-10E

35-55-10N 124-50-25E.

B. 15-08-19N 124-46-15E

15-09-35N 123-45-27E

19-24-32N 123-54-26E

19-23-08N 124-45-13E.

CANCEL THIS MSG 150400Z APR.

Stage 1 would impact in zone A; stage 2 in zone B.

The launch site is located at 39.660107 N, 124.705203 E.

To be sun-synchronous, a 500 km orbit requires an inclination of 97.42 deg. At the latitude of the launch site, a trajectory that directly ascends to that inclination requires a launch azimuth of approximately 192.3 deg (12.3 deg west of due south). The azimuth from the launch site through the various impact zones downrange should agree closely with this value, typically within a degree or so, absent any significant yaw-steering (aka dogleg) early in the ascent.

The azimuth from the launch site to the midpoint of the southern boundary of the 2nd stage's impact zone (approx. 15.15 N, 124.26 E) is 181.0 deg, which is far from the required 192.3 deg.

I considered the possibility of an eastward dogleg early in the ascent, but the trajectory would have to turn toward approximately 192 deg azimuth well before the 2nd stage ceased firing, in which case the 2nd stage's impact zone should be oriented with its east and west sides pointing roughly toward azimuth 191 deg, but they do not. The west side points toward azimuth 181.8 deg, and the east side 179.8 deg - again far from the required value, and essentially identical to the azimuth calculated from the launch site. Therefore, there is no dogleg, which is not surprising, since it would involve overflying the Korean peninsula, probably including South Korea.

I do not see how North Korea could reach a sun-synchronous orbit from the new launch site without risk to populated areas. Launching directly toward the required 192.3 deg azimuth would result in a trajectory that skirts China's east coast near Shanghai. The rocket's second stage would overfly Taiwan, before impacting in a zone bordering within perhaps 50 km of the west coast of the northern Philippines.

To give a *very rough* idea of the effect of launching directly toward azimuth 192.3 deg, I have adjusted the longitudes of North Korea's NOTAMs:

A. 35-12-25N 123-42E

35-12-13N 123-20E

35-55-20N 123-33E

35-55-10N 123-51E

B. 15-08-19N 119-38E

15-09-35N 118-56E

19-24-32N 119-43E

19-23-08N 120-34E

I very much doubt that North Korea plans for its rocket stages to fall in the zones I have estimated, but it is for North Korea to explain the inconsistency between the orbit it claims to be targeting and the NOTAMs it provided.

Ted Molczan (10)

______________________________________________

Seesat-l mailing list

http://mailman.satobs.org/mailman/listinfo/seesat-l

The NOTAMs are consistent with an 88.7 deg inclination, which is nowhere near sun-synchronous.

As I discussed in my analysis, for the 2nd stage impact to occur as given in the NOTAMs, would require an eastward dogleg early in the ascent, overflying the Korean peninsula, probably including S. Korea. I can tell they are not planning to do that, because if they were, then the 2nd stage impact NOTAM coordinates would be pointing toward approx. azimuth 191 deg, instead of the actual ~181 deg. Of course, it is highly unlikely they would perform such a dogleg, because it would create a huge international incident to cross S. Korea.

My analysis shows that without an eastward dogleg, they would have to follow a trajectory that skirts China's east coast near Shanghai, and the 2nd stage would pass over Taiwan and impact close to the west coast of the northern Philippines. I provide the approximate 2nd stage NOTAMs for that scenario, but I do not believe that is what they intend.

Had they claimed the orbit was near-polar, without adding the sun-synchronous claim, then the NOTAMs would be consistent. Given North Korea's historical lack of credibility, and considering that the sun-synchronous claim was attributed by KCNA to "a vice director of the Space Development Department of the Korean Committee for Space Technology (KCST)", I believe that the most reasonable interpretation is that they are lying about this being a satellite launch, which has been betrayed by the incompetence of their propagandists in over-reaching in their cover story. (11)

Sun-synchronous orbits generally are preferred for both earth-resources and IMINT satellites. An 88.7 deg orbit would be considered a poor choice for such missions. An ordinary polar launch (near 90 deg) cannot be narrowed down to any specific type of mission. But North Korea has claimed an ERTS type mission in sun-synchronous orbit, so they must be held to that claim and required to account for its inconsistency with the NOTAMs, because both cannot be true. Orbits between roughly 85 deg and 90 deg are seldom used for RECSAT or ERTS. They are not strongly associated with any particular type of mission, but have been used for various types of scientific research, communications (e.g. Iridium), navigation (e.g. Transit) and SIGINT. (12)

 

Wake Up Call: 

Regardless of the policy issues if this and the subsequent announcements on this DPRK launch was a surprise to US Government policy makers of the Executive branch of government including Department of Defense, Intelligence Agencies, and State Department personnel certainly indicates that they were not well informed on the facts of the know n’s of the DPRK, fiscal FYP. That made this launch entirely predictable as previously stated. None of this should have been a surprise. Once again this knowledge seems to have fallen on deaf ears and blind eyes to the obvious reality. This is after years of being told this reality going back to the Cold War years both in writing and verbally in the appropriate means both in the classified and open source realms. CPV See: http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/dprk/dprk-economic-fiscal%20planning.htm

To read some of the published statements from personnel within the government as well as formerly recently employed by the governments seriously leaves the wrong impression of the existing reality and certainly indicates a lack of depth of understanding expected.

“ Analysts say evidence of this is that the satellite launch must have been in the works for a long time - certainly before North Korea's diplomats were finalizing the deal announced with Washington on February 29.” Sharon Squassoni, is a former adviser to the U.S. Congress on weapons of mass destruction, that is now the director of the proliferation prevention program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "These latest moves by North Korea have surprised even some of the most seasoned North Korean watchers," Squassoni said. …... So I think this is something that predates the ascendance of Kim Jong Un to leadership in North Korea." Suqassoni spoke at the Asian Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul prior to their participation at a conference "What Does North Korea Want?: A Deal or a Crisis?"“(14)

And another quote: “ ….right after it announced the satellite launch, there is a strong chance that it has been planned for a long time.” (15)

The US government was in fact warned by the DPRK, of the pending planned launch on Dec 15, 2011 according to several press reports.

 

Hello People wake up and think?

Something else to consider on another related issue note the following: the PRC China is the master of Deception and Psychological Warfare taught to North Korea for mind and perception, Strategic Control as it is a way of life in China and North Korea effectively utilized in the Kim case. This was through rumor and other controls of perception feeding the world what they desired for us to believe verses reality. Kim’s remarkable recovery from a so called 2008 stroke was a deception as was much more and China is culpable in this reality regardless of what was stated officially. In this case the transition had long been planned in a hurry up effort to settle issues as well as purge those opposed to the leadership change and prepared because it was expected and known well ahead of time. One look at his complexion says volumes about what was going on in reality. Supposedly the Chinese did surgery on the stroke area of the brain but there was no sign of this but what they may have uncovered what has since transpired leading to his heart attack death. The 2006 by-static projection of the intended missile launch deception of the TD-2 launch failure is another example of this controlled by China in cooperation with the NK flight test attempt.”

 

 Satellite Booster arrival On the Launch Infrastructure

The Unha-3 booster first two stages “Main Body” in addition to other elements of the satellite launch vehicle arrived on it transport erector inside the Dongchang-ri , Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province. It was delivered to the onsite MIK horizontal assembly check out building on or about March 24, 2012 via the newly completed railroad infrastructure from the north Pyongyang, Sanum-dong Missile Development Center factory according to South Korean officials. The information was provided by the South Korean defense ministry and it’s Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday, March 25, 2012 via South Korean & U. S. Military intelligence sources without attribution. (16)

Imagery Reports

The March 20, 2012 GeoEye commercial imagery first images report was released on this web site revealing very little activity in major infrastructure facilities prior to launch vehicle arrival. See: http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/120322840-new-imagery-shows-north-korean.htm

The March 28, 2012 DigitalGlobe commercial imagery revealed that contrary to reports out of Japan there was no booster on the pad at that time though the infrastructure activity had indeed commenced as evident in the increased vehicles traffic present. Follow up survey suggested that all the propellant tanker trucks had arrived and may have finished their initial delivery to the launch pad infrastructure semi underground storage sites behind the gantry umbilical tower. Among those were about 16 tankers at one parking clean out site while a second clean out parking site has about 8 tankers. There is in fact a third semi-underground propellant storage facility along with the fourth facility for high pressure gases converter facility for such gases as Nitrogen and or Helium all installed all along the same pad circling road behind the gantry umbilical tower.

The additions of a mobile radar and telemetry receiving equipped van were also identified at the end of a newly developed unfinished road. This is typical of previous test launches of the Unha-2 booster launch preparation.

Propellants

The first stage propellant are strongly believed to be based on Scud-B propellant as noted from Soviet manuals which is TM-185 20% Gasoline, 80% Kerosene while its oxidizer is believed to be AK-27I 27% N2O4 + 73% HNO3 with Iodium inhibitor Nitrogen Tetroxide & Nitric Acid.

SEE: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/td-2-specs.htm and http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nd-a-propellants.htm

The second stage Propellant is known from Soviet Naval references manuals to be Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) while its oxidizer is known to be a derivation of Inhibited Red Fuming nitric Acid (IRFNA) like that used in the first stage.

The shroud surrounded third stage is primarily a Chinese PRC derived solid motor with a liquid storable propellant attitude control unit with post boost maneuvering capability for satellite deployment.

 

Third Stage Design Change out to Liquid Iranian Derived Stage Design

The 30 meter long & 2.5 meters in diameter, 91 metric tonnes launch vehicle with 120 tonnes thrust Unha-2, 3/TD-2 booster’s, third stage is an Iranian derived liquid stage of the Safir program but much more sophisticated in this rendition difference from the failed solid motor design of the 2009 launch. (27) (29)

 

IMAGES NEEDED

All of the imagery to date has been plagued by only views behind and to the left or right of the gantry umbilical tower but not a front view that is consistently required as events progress.

The March 31, 2012 GeoEye commercial Imagery still shows no launch vehicle on the pad but the gantry tarps curtains appear to be in the process of being added from the top down to the ground to the service levels for environmental control.

The April 1-8, 2012 commercial imagery is not available for unknown reasons but is presumed to shows no clear view of a booster on the pad as suggested by Chosun Ilbo from information obtained from South Korean government sources. (17). However the gantry umbilical tower curtains tarps installation is also presumed to have been completed from the ground to the top of the service levels. The DPRK booster installation on the launch pad was expected to occur during the period April 5, through April 7, 2012 based on Soviet class operation practices analysis. The possibility of the booster first three stages being on the pad is considered possible but not proven. The presumed possibility of the booster first three stages being on the pad is considered high but not proven. The encapsulated satellite and then the third stage shrouds should have been installed but that remains uncertain on this writing (17)

Whether the erector transporter was used in this particular case to assemble the completed booster on the pad remains unknown and unproven at this reading. South Korea officials in the Chosun Ilbo article suggested that it was to be lifted by the gantry umbilical tower crane stacking one stage at a time but again it was definitely fully assembled on the pad by the end of Friday April 7 th., if not earlier according to South Korean officials exactly as expected. (17)

The April 8, 2012 Imagery came from the onsite invited guest of the international press of over 70 reporters AP, Reuters, AFP, CNN, NBC, BBC, Swiss TV, Le Monde, Vietnamese TV, Phoenix TV, Channel News Asia, Indonesia TV One, South African’s ETV, Brazil’s Estado de Soa Paulo, Kyodo News, NHK, , Zvezda, NTV, Russia Channel One, German’s RARD, Sweden’s STV,inhua, and Sky News, with two space specialist James Oberg and Christian Lardier as guest of the DPRK. They are to be followed by other still in transit. Most of the journalist and Specialists arrived on Friday and Saturday DPRK time in spite of the US asking the world press and specialist not to give support to the DPRK peaceful space launch, geo-political legitimizing, physiological warfare efforts. They had to take a five hour train ride of 115 kilometers to the launch infrastructure from Pyongyang. (28) Literally the gantry umbilical tower curtain tarps encasing the service levels have disappeared from the service levels before April 7 was over from the March 31-April 5 installation and use before removal.

Post April 8 th activity to follow. The DPRK official at the launch site acknowledged that in the following days fueling of the “ 30 meter tall 2.5 meter diameter, 91 metric tonnes with 120 tonnes thrust Unha-3 carrier rocket ” space booster would be carried out then it would be followed with the installation of the 100 Kg small polar orbiting earth observation imaging satellite for weather and earth resources. This was apparently from the General Manager of the satellite launch infrastructure Mr. Jang Myong Jin. He also emphasized that “this launch had been in the planning for a long time” and that the booster can be destroyed by ground controllers and that the vehicle also has a sensing system on board to destroy itself if it starts to deviate from the planned programmed trajectory. (29)

Additionally he noted that the DPRK plans to launch a 400 metric tonnes booster in the future. (29)

 

Launch Timing Question

To suggest a launch within two weeks of arrival on site as recently suggested is highly improbable. Based on past practices it is more likely to entail 50-55  days or on the order of less than 10 days to  in the horizontal assembly building to prepare the three stage booster and payload assembly before sending it to the pad horizontally fully assembled to erect it on the pad for 8-10 days build up prior to launch. This is based on the 50 day or more horizontal assembly building build up process previously observed that was followed by the 20 and later on 10-12 days on the pad lead up to launch.  Today they are calling for a launch to orbit between April 12-16, 2012 or all done in less than 20 days as compared to past practices observed. This clearly means this system has been in the planning preparation stage since the middle of the last five year plan of the DPRK. The expectations suggest for roll out that they are attempting to perfect an almost Soviet styled launch preparation operation. That implies that the vehicle will not go to the pad until 5-7 days prior to launch. The gantry crane can only lift the shrouds for the third stage and payload as well as the payload itself. The roll out may be only the three stages with those shrouds, payload being applied afterwards as was observed in 2009. The entire point is that the total three stages of the TD-2 is brought to the pad fully assembled and erected fully assembled on to the pad first as previously noted in 2009 and now in 2012. Then the shroud encapsulated payload is attached separately on top of the third stage followed by the two piece third stage shroud. This is because the third stage shrouds are jettisoned first before the payload shroud as was graphically seen in 2009 and is expected in 2012. Everybody academically but except for the US intelligence community/DoD that enhances its ICBM application but has missed this entire point. However a weapon that requires such extensive fixed site infrastructure is not a viable ICBM though that application remains a national security threat. The space launch is now scheduled for the morning of April 12, 2012 according to world press reports from North Korea.

Unha-2/Taep’o-dong-2B ballistic missile, space booster April 5, 2009

 

Tracking, Range & Intelligence Observation Information Collection Efforts

Based on what North Korea has already given notice of it can be expected to clear fishing in the yellow sea through March 11-17, 2012 suggest that the launch from the West coast facility Tongchang-ri is going to fly out over the yellow sea in a near due south direction towards the equator not over South Korea and is as stated designed to place a satellite in near polar orbit that would be placed in orbit before flying over the Philippine region. The second stage impact zone is in the south Philippine Sea near Indonesia (New Guinea) near the Philippine Trench. Longer range flights could be flown out of the Tangch’ang-dong facility flying over South Korea to impact west of Australia 6,700 kilometers down range. The probability of the North Koreans flying out over North Korea or South Korean mainland I submit is highly improbable because of internal impact or avoidance of failure disaster issues much less threat issues confirming the polar orbit intent stated by the DPRK. To launch a satellite would be valid but an LRICBM would in part invalidate their clam of a space program for this booster proving the obvious dual purpose of the flights leading to external export to Iran for hard currency.

All previous international assets of South Korea and Japan in addition to the US are expected to commit to the data collection surveillance efforts. The two South Korean King Sejong and Yulgok Yi Aegis class Aegis–class destroyers’ equipped with 1,000 km radar’s, three Japanese Kongo Class Aegis–class destroyer’s equipped radar’s in addition to land based radars and SIGINT operations are to be part of the effort. Multiple US surveillance means such as land and sea based SIGINT and radar surveillance ships and crewed aircraft, stealth UAV’s in addition to sonar equipped ships of the various navy’s are certainly expected to be a part of the combined efforts. Down range ship based and land based surveillance efforts are to be assumed as also being a part of the regional effort. This like in 2006 and 2009 is to acquire the maximum independently crosses checked duplicative radar data as well as DPRK infrastructure operational data as is possible to correctly define the space booster’s systems performance or lack of performance as the case has been in the previous two experimental launch attempts. (18, 19)

The US has put its Pacific Ocean deployed mobile oil–rig floating platform sea based large advanced 2,000 km range X-Band Radar-1 out of the Pearl Harbor home port on March 23, 2012 in preparation for monitoring the next TD-2 launch attempt. The U. S. Seventh Fleet has also committed five or six class Aegis destroyers along the launch corridor. Japan is putting its Maritime Self Defense Forces, Aegis class destroyer’s in the East China Sea also called the Western Yellow-Sea near South Korea to monitor the Unha-3 launch for anti-ballistic missile defense but especially as a part of the U. S., South Korean and Japanese data gathering radar network and SIGINT electronic monitoring operations. The entire region around South Korea and Japan down through the Philippine region, western Pacific launch corridor is to have sea-based, land and space based systems sensors electronic monitoring of the entire flight for the maximum amount of duplicative data and provide for missile defense requirements if required. Besides the sea based Aegis class ships of the U.S., Japan and South Korea there are also land based SIGINT station in both Japan and South Korea as well as ground based radars and space tracking gear being prepared for this monitoring operation. All monitored data is being coordinated between the three nations and their deployed assets but especially for national security intelligence analysis. (18, 19) There is little doubt that DoD has imaged the launch pad activities regardless of weather, conditions, night or day on the round the clock operational basis by various means such as imaging stealth UAVs and stealth radar imaging UAVs.

 

The Semi-mobile ICBM Viability Question?

Knowing what is understood from the previous North Korean flight testing experience with the Unha-2/Taep’o-dong-2, missile, space booster launch preparation allows the all source analyst to predict its present build up operations with a degree of reasonable estimation certainty on what to expect. That analysis must also take into account other issues such as North Koreas notorious deception operations that ultimately impact that estimation as the trends reveal themselves. Completion of the Tongch'ang-dong, launch facility was previously predicted and written by this author because of his engineering, technology, architectural, construction industry experience in addition to his space design technology and program administration, planning knowledge

The intelligence activity that caught ever bodies attention was observed at the factory at Sanum'dong fourteen miles or 22.53 km north of Pyongyang in which only the movements of the estimated 32-35 meter long erector transporter was seen. It is a flatbed cargo carrier left side mounted power, heating air conditioning environmental control unit for the third stage and payload with front and rear mounted driving cabs, yellow colored strong back erector, transporter based both on imagery and published descriptions of the equipment and its utilization. It was reported that the missile under green tarps was as expected placed on the erector transporter and in turn it was placed on an about "40 meter long" [39.24 m] railroad car among three railroad cars utilized for this logistic operations. Normally railroad cars are on the order of 14.62-19.62 meters in length according to international design standards. It is believed to have been shipped Pongdong-ni, or Dongchong-ni or Tongch'ang-dong the new west coast launch facility infrastructure and not to the Musudan-ni facility infrastructure on the east coast. That journey started May 29, 2009 and should have taken both a train from Sanum'dong to Tetsuzan and road transport trip to Tongch'ang-dong lasting no more than three days at most.

 

The Unha-2, Taep'o-dong-2B launch vehicle transporter erector from the Digital Globe imagery, 26 March 2009, the day the booster was placed on the pad. The next day it was not visible at the site.

 

Unha-2, Taep'o-dong-2B on its erector transporter

 

Circumstantial evidence has begun to suggest to US intelligence that North Korea may be attempting to develop a semi-mobile ICBM as documented by Bill Gertz of the Washington Times. Presumably it is based on the previously noted information. It strongly suggest that the Taepodong-2 (TD-2) dual-use ICBM and space launcher is the primary bases of its development along with the newer taller launch facility gantry umbilical tower Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province somehow associated with it. This information though thin was initially suggested by then Defense Secretary Dr. Robert M. Gates. (20, 21)

Typically road mobile missiles are based on solid propellants that make them hard to track but quick to launch with almost no warning. It takes hours or days to weeks to launch large liquid propellant missiles from open launch pads much less coffin or Silo or cave based tunnels.

 

First Appearance of the New DPRK “Satan”, ICBM, Space Booster

The semi-mobile ICBM presumably is based on 6,700 km range TD-2 and the transporter observed as shown in the accompanying photo and illustrations. It cannot be based on the No-dong-B/Mirim/ Musudan because even with added upper stages it still would not have the range. Considering the West coast Tongch'ang-dong taller gantry umbilical tower that has to portend the development of newer upper stages for the TD-2 based on No-dong-B 1.5 meter diameter technology, that is already its second stage, which in turn will match the first stage diameter of the TD-2 of 2.4-2.6 meters.

That is the postulated very real 40 meter long; 10,000 km range Taep'o-dong- 3 the DPRK “Satan” three stages ICBM, space booster. It was first reported as being imaged by a U. S. reconnaissance satellite at its north Pyongyang, Sanum-dong Missile Development Center factory by The Chosun Ilbo on April 3, 2012. Whether it is a full size mock-up or more probable functional facilities, all systems up, ground & logistic test vehicle is not fully certain. It may be displayed during an anniversary military paraded on April 15 in Pyongyang. (22) This is based on the design process applied by the DPRK. It is possibly the previously predicted follow on semi-mobile missile suggested by Dr. Gates & that Iran would need for its planned manned spacecraft program so here we have another potentially cooperative program in development between the two countries. (20, 21, 22) After all how could Iran plan on such a vehicle without knowing it was in the pipe line for them?

Interesting enough this new uprated missile may be able to be adapted to fit the existing logistic transporter erector already in use. A 40 meter long missile whether 2.4 - 3.35 meters in diameter is an unwieldy monster to handle logistically no matter what its purpose. It literally exceeds the SS-9, SS-18 ICBM length of the former Soviet Union and may sport a cluster of up to 6 revised first stage engine designs possibly of 180,000 tonnes thrust x triple barrels = 540,000 tonnes thrust liftoff with a “400 tonnes booster” [just what Iran needs] utilizing throughout a fuel of Unsymmetrical Dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) while its oxidizer is a derivation of Inhibited Red Fuming nitric Acid (IRFNA) in all stages. (29)

Equally its size does not easily adapt to a semi-mobile ICBM and one ends up wonder if this is not a super space booster only with growth potential but also that it is two different animals being explored here. That is one huge space booster with growth potential and a smaller semi-mobile ICBM that has yet to appear. It definitely reflects what Iran and the DPRK would need to be a manned space booster. It is however known that Iran is working on Solid propellant longer range missile possible ICBM for its military so perhaps the DPRK will also produce it in the not too distant future as a trade for the large 40 meter long space booster though that is speculation based on some known’ s.]

 

The General Manager of the satellite launch infrastructure Mr. Jang Myong Jin stated that the DPRK plans to launch a 400 metric tonnes total mass space booster in the future . (29)

Only time will define these design characteristics publicly.

This may be speculation but it’s based on calculated circumstantial evidence. For that case Iranian Simorgh-3 IRILV {Phoenix-3}, Block-I could become mobile also. Circumstantially it would appear that the two stage TD-2 variant could be mobile and may have already been paraded in the DPRK several times but not shown publically for the world’s consumption.

Yes Iran has the solid motor technology demonstrated but has it been transferred to the DPRK is at this writing possible but not proven in spite of the level of cooperation in missile & nuclear weapons well documented and demonstrated. Iran and DPRK have the No-dong-B that was flight tested on January 17, 2006 out of Iran for both the DPRK and Iran traveling some 3,218 km of its known potential 3,861 km range demonstrated then during one of the DPRK’s moratoriums. In that respect this is both confirmed by the Israeli Intelligence sources & methods but especially the U. S. Ballistic Defense Agency officials in speeches.

 

The critical point is No-dong-B:

Finally on January 29, 2007 the US government acknowledged for the first time the existence of several new Iranian and North Korean missiles under development through a speech by the deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency of the Pentagon Army Brig. General Patrick O’Reilly before the George C Marshall Institute. In that speech he described the Iranian two stage Ghadr-110 solid propellant missile with a range of (1,324 miles) 1,995.16 or close to 2,000 kilometers. It has been known that the Iranians are working on the Ghadr-101 as well as the Ghadr-110 solid propellant missiles. The Ghadr-101 solid motor development was completed in 2005. He also described the two stage Taep’o-dong-2C/3 as having a range of (6,200 Miles) 9,975.8 kilometers and the three stage version with a range of (9,300 miles) 14,963.7 kilometers with a 250 kg warhead. He went further in his slides presentation to show that the No-dong-B has a demonstrated range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) when it is capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers. (24) The No-dong-B was described as “a qualitative improvement in the performance” from earlier North Korean missile systems. The Iranian Ghadr-101, 110, 110A will in fact also provides Iran with an ASAT capability besides its operational MRBM and IRBM capability. (23)

Today we know the maximum potential range of No-dong-B is 3,861 km not 4,000 km though 3,218 km has been demonstrated successfully

Iranian solid propellant missile developments and expectations as it are understood at this writing. It is believed that Iran is reworking Ashura with Sejjil proven technology but it is a delicate program with several dramatic failures experienced so far both on the ground and inflight. For the present the Sejjil has replaced Ashura for the present. But is the DPRK getting that solid motor technology?

The possibility of getting solid motor technology in the DPRK is not unrealistic based on the two countries cooperation. I also know the last stage of TD-2 is not the design that other academics have postulated because I have the open source imagery available of the before and after the shroud was put in place showing the solid motor and its base liquid propellants attitude control system. The following image shows the growth potential TD-2/Simorgh-3 design possibilities.

Comparision North Korean (DPRK) and Iranian ballistic missiles & Space boosters

 

Serious Reality Questions on the Semi-mobile ICBM Viability

Realistically these are very large booster rocket systems of a semi-mobile designs on the order of 29-33 meter long and as wide as a railroad car requiring considerable mobile ground support systems in addition to weeks of preparation on pre-surveyed soft sites. Since they are not deployed in “coffin”, “silo” or “cave/underground tunnel” based military garrison sites brings into question their viability as strategic ballistic missile system but yet there is that potential option to attempt to operate in that fashion with its potential strategic threat that cannot be ignored. Let us all hope that not too much is being read into this national security threat potential since there are only two viable sites capable of launching such a large missile system with its considerable support personnel and mobile fueling vehicles in addition to the extensive launch infrastructure support.

 

The Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province , Pongdong-ni, or Dongchong-ni or Tongch'ang-dong West Coast Facilities Status

The North Korean build up to its third flight test of the Unha-2 booster has taken years to be fulfilled. Movements from the Sanum’dong missile research factory with the erector transporter and railroad, road transportation to the Pongdong-ni, or Dongchong-ni or Tongch'ang-dong, launch facility of a prototype TD-2/ Unha-2 class booster first two stages initially took place over May 29-31, 2009 possible for logistic testing as well as personnel facilities infrastructure testing training purposes. The results of those tests suggest that military and design specialist ultimately decided to build a facilities access railroad to cut down the 15 kilometer road access logistic issues to the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province. Digital Globe imagery from the June 3, 2009 orbital pass shows that its launch facility is very close to being finished with little remaining in the construction materials lay down yard beside the on pad tarmac and gantry umbilical tower.

Again early in the week of June 15, 2009 another erector transporter and the railroad, road transportation from the Sanum’dong missile research factory in route to the Musudan-ni launch site was reported to have taken place according to South Korean Government intelligence sources. It probably took place over the week of June 7-14, 2009.

What is striking both in the Musudan-ni and Tongch’ang-dong facilities are the very clear indication of a near total lack of activity leading up to satellite launches or ballistic missile flight tests. The further lack of any press reports of buildup activity from the South Korean and Japanese as well as US intelligence sources strongly suggest that the launch attempts are not expected any time soon and this only represented testing operations. Indeed all intelligence sources have subsequently confirmed this judgment as correct based on the open source imagery analysis.

Through August 12, 2009 there had still been no reports of either launch site showing launch preparation activity after the earlier delivery of the launch vehicles to the Tongch’ang-dong facilities infrastructure. The noted Musudan-ni transporter erector return to the factory probably means that that was merely the same erector seen on site earlier on March 26, 2009 imagery above for the April 5, 2009 launch of the second Unha-2, Taep'o-dong-2B and that no launch was expected from that site in the near term.

On October 26, 2009 South Korean official, without attribution, let it be known that the DPRK had recently finished the construction process for the Dongchang-ri launch facility pad gantry umbilical tower infrastructure. Further they noted that facilities are in the process of being used for testing of missile components. The primary launch pad and its gantry umbilical tower with its clam shell service levels was the last element requiring construction detailing completion based on available open source imagery. Back in June South Korean officials had indicated that a Unha-2/Taep’o-dong-2 class three stage missile had been delivered to the Dongchang-ri launch infrastructure via its road mobile erector transporter and railroad train for a potential ground testing or launch when desired.

How could such as series of flight tests be so quickly orchestrated so soon after the second flight test failure of April 5, 2009 of the Unha-2 booster, with its third stage ignition failure gives one pause when reviewing such considerations?

They had apparently produced 20 boosters by 2006 according to intelligence revealed by the then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld separate from the R&D elements copies so they are down to perhaps 18 boosters being updated as required back at the factory at this point. That is two boosters have been expended in experimental prototype flight testing and maybe one more has been sent the west coast launch site sites leaving about 17 boosters in their inventory some of which may be committed to sale for Iran.

This has still left this analyst unhappy with the large variables results except to say the original design underwent dramatic design changes during the 2001 through 2005 five year plan. Ultimately the rear gantry umbilical towers 42 inch tall railing will probably prove to be the real scaling answer along with the Solid motor third stage and the second stage 1.5 meter diameter dimensions identified that will finally define the close design dimensions. That has now been clarifuied by DPRK officials.

The Unha-2, Taep'o-dong-2B -final design with its solid, liquid fueled third stage that failed in 2009.

The 2012, 30 meter long 2.5 meter diameter 120 tonnes thrust liftoff at 91 metric tonnes mass Unha-2 booster design shows a new third stage highly refined design liquid storable propellant stage based on second stage vernier’s and their separate engine pump system utilized in a similar design that Iran has flown successfully on its Safir-II space boosters second stage. (29)

 

The Pongdong-ni, or Dongchong-ni or Tongch'ang-dong West Coast Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province, Facility Details

What is important is the information obtained from the June 3, 2009 imagery that the gantry umbilical tower has no large gantry crane with only a small light crane at best is identifiable in available imagery. This implies that the booster payload combination is brought to the pad fully assembled payload and all on a thirty two-thirty five meter long erector transporter as seen in Musudan-ni, March 26, 2009 imagery. The erector transporter with the fully assembled booster and payload fits the estimated booster length of on the order of thirty meters or more regardless of the payload configuration. Close study of the top of the gantry umbilical tower in fact seems to show a foundation for the potential installation of a gantry crane but that does not mean anything until it appears or is sub planted by the erector transporter. In fact no large capacity crane has been seen through March 20, 2012. Certainly the kind of huge cranes required to erect such a gantry crane are not visible on site at the time of the last imagery available. No personnel or vehicular traffic is present in the imagery.

There is a new concrete roadway to enter the primary much more modern multi bayed horizontal assembly building. Additionally there is a separate much more modern series of separate payload and last stage processing and range control buildings separate from but nearby the main MIK horizontal assembly building.

Among those separate horizontal assembly buildings is a payload processing building that is apparently for the third stage as well as the payload with it vertical assembly high bay area. Also there is a separate nearby test firing RCS systems (reaction control system) building that is apparently partially exposed and none destruct explosive processing area building near this payload processing building. Here again the imagery reveals there is no evidence of vehicular or personnel activity during the day.

It has been possible to identify the apparent launch control center with its separate parking facility. Launch control appears to be an above ground multi storied higher elevation building from the launch pad area nearby up range from the general launch site.

No launch pad vertical processing assembly building is anticipated to be built on the launch pad tarmac site at this time through March 20, 2012 if it ever appears. This bringing into question the requirements for such an installation in the face of the horizontal assembly operations based on the semi-mobile transporter erector.

It has not been possible to identify the VIP viewing areas and other sites for mobile telemetry and mobile radar tracking equipment not that they are not there because of the many differences in this newer facility as opposed to east coast Musudan-ni infrastructure.

 

Measured Construction Progress

This west coast facility as early as December 23, 2008 was still in the process of having the smaller diameter upper stage service levels built on the ground before installation. By February 17, 2009 it still did not have all its service levels and there was no gantry crane present with a considerable amount of construction materials hardware still remaining lying on the tarmac ground lay down area. This meant that it was not ready yet. That has since been considerable accelerated towards completion with the new railroad access to the MIK horizontal assembly building with its added road access and concrete receiving areas.

 

Some Questions of What is being prepared for Testing Remain Unanswered

Previously I did wonder in 2009 if the booster is not in fact a ground logistic facility’s systems test launch vehicle and not a flight vehicle. South Korean intelligence sources have suggest a similar possibility because it is assumed to be too early for a flight test after the recent flight failure of the third stage on April 5, 2009. Certainly a ground test missile sent to the Pongdong-ni, or Dongchong-ni or Tongch'ang-dong site would not be unexpected but there is at present no way openly to know the answer to this issue. The issue is concern about when the gantry umbilical towers facilities check out flushing prior to flight test hardware introduction is to be carried out or has it already been done via small ground test apparatus? Since the automated fueling facilities are completed it may have recently been cleared for operations.

Weapons Systems Application

The booster design can accommodate a 1.35 meter base diameter conical re-entry vehicle of 1,158 kilogram or a 650 kilogram tri-conic warhead design with a smaller base diameter. Certainly the range performance analysis of the booster subsequent to its flight test on April 5, 2009 must leave all previous analysis in the waste bind suggesting a considerable upgrade in the design than previously considered. The implied minimum range performance of well in excess of 6,700 kilometers to as much as 10,000 kilometers has apparently surprised the intelligence community.

Guidance System Performed

The guidance system performed from liftoff was much better than that seen with the 1998 Taep'o-dong-1 first satellite launch attempt. Taep'o-dong-1 flew near vertically before angling over and moving down rang but this Taep'o-dong-2 almost immediately curved over heading down range as a satellite launch should carry out in a very smooth flight pattern. It was even possible to see it correct its direction of flight as it moved down range soon after launch.

North Korea’s continued insistence that it is “their right to have a launch as a part of their space program to be an economic power” is certainly important in understanding that this effort is driven by the need for hard foreign currency for the regimes survival. The fear is what Iran has already gotten from North Korea.


Economic Reality Not Updated since 2009!

There has also been information released in 2006 by South Korean, National Assembly member Chung Hyung-Keun according to the North Korean Zone web site that North Korea intends to produce as many as seventeen Taep'o-dong-2 class launch vehicles for internal deployment and foreign sales. The Taep'o-dong-2 class booster first rendition is estimated to cost $62,893,081.76 while the rest are estimated at $26,250,450.73 (2006)--$30,000,000.00 (2009) each by the NIS. It was also noted that according to the NIS the 400 Scuds cost about $200,000.00 each which equal a total of $120,000,000.00 and the 450, No-dong-A's cost about $400,000.00 each equals $1,800,000,000.00. These figures seem low to reality. In the past the Taep'o-dong-1 cost was also given for its very limited production run of perhaps less than five vehicles after the estimated 10 R&D test models one of which was apparently sold to Iran and looked at by Pakistan.

North Korea is said to have gain as much as an estimated $1.5 billion dollars a year in earlier years from foreign missile sales. On Aug. 3, 2006 a report was released by the South Korean funded State run think tank ( IFANS) Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security suggested that the commercial cost of the latest Scud-ER's is about $2,000,000.00 each and that the cost of the No-dong-A's is about $4,000,000.00 each with the Taep'o-dong-2 class missile being about $20,000,000.00-$30,000,000.00 each. It further stated that North Korea has annually obtained $150 million (or billion) from exported missile sales or both parts and technology. Total sales may be in the $580 million (or billion) ranges. Somewhere in this pricing process their clearly is the dollar devaluation inflation factor well before the recent global economic down fall. They also indicated that the North Koreans have about 200 No-dong-A's [versus previous reports of 450] and 50 No-dong-B's deployed in addition to 600 varying types of Scud's [versus previous reports of 400 plus]. Iran has received two shipments of No-dong-B’s. Clearly the pricing of the Scud's and No-doing-A's has been mixed up with the million dollar figures which are probably more accurate but the Taep'o-dong-2 pricing is reasonably accurate. No cost for the Taep'o-dong-1 pathfinder missile for the Taep'o-dong-2 class missile was given and no information indicated it was deployed. It is estimated that the Taep’o-dong-1 missile first models cost about $18,800,000.00 – $20,000,000.00 while the commercial cost was around $5,900,000.00 - $6,000,000.00 each copy. Literally the whole Taep’o-dong-2 program may well exceed “$537,634,408.61 – $604,837,709.68 in total investment of national resources, man hours, personnel and facilities equipment of the North Korean economy. The total missile programs investment through its many years must easily exceed many billions of equivalent dollars total. 

According to South Korean military officials the estimated 2012 US dollars cost of the new Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province is about $400 million while the booster rocket and payload is estimated at $300 million and $150 million. The total country wide cost was estimated at $850 million. (24)

Additionally it is believed by South Korean senior military officials that the DPRK has some 10,000 personnel working on missile programs and that over 3.1 billion has been spent on the long range ballistic missile and space booster program. (26)

Rough Order Magnitude North Korean, Missile Program Expenditures Expressed in Western Terms not DPRK Terms

Based on 2006-2009 figures estimated national investment of resources in Western experience terms

Type System

Numbers deployed

Commercial cost in $

1 St. Models R&D 10 vehicle test elements

Totals

Scud-B/C’s

600

$200,000.00 /each


$120,000,000.00

Scud-ER’s

400

$2,000,000.00 /each


$800,000,000.00

No-dong-A’s

200-450

$4,000,000,00 /each


$1,800,000,000.00

No-dong-B’s

50 or more

$7,800,000.00?

$?

$?

Taep’o-dong-1’s

15 or more 10 R&D

$6,000,000.00

$18,800,000.00 -$20,000,000.00

$48,800,000.00-

$50,000,000.00

Taep’o-dong-2’s

25 or more 5-10 R&D & 20 production

$20,000,000.00

$26,250,450.73 -$30,000,000.00

$62,893,081.76

$587,902,096.36-$662,893,081.76 or $537,634,408.61 -$604,837,709.68





Total estimated investments which does not include military first infrastructure and industrial base, food, housing and for the additional foreign production sales etc.

$4,037,730,791.44



Foreign yearly high estimated income from sales and technical knowhow in excess of $1,500,000,000.00 the past yearly high, to - $580,000,000.000.00 billion total but these figures have been going down in recent years. The $1.5 billion yearly high has long since disappeared. This is for DPRK needed hard currency for world trade. Also the dollar value has been steadily devalued for this period considered.



Note:

The command economy of North Korea with the military first at the serving table policy actually has no relationship or convertibility to the world economy currencies thus all of these figures suggested above are merely Western suggested cost thinking based on the dollar values on the international; currency market which continuously changes not the nominal real materials, personnel, equipment and man hour resources basis of the DPRK’s economy. The DPRK can declare a hard currency value in a foreign currency for sales purposes as it must but that is a subjective estimation of reality as they do not know what it is worth in really for its products and services .

Notes: "While the official national designator of this facility is West Coast Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Cholsan County, North Phyongan Province it is common practice to name such facilities by using the name of the closest populated place. In this case it could be either the small village of Pongdong-ni or Kwi-gol, both of which were partially demolished during the military facility construction. The designation Pongdong-ni Missile and Space Launch Facility is used here for readability. Other names sometimes suggested include Tongch'ang-dong and Dongchong-ni."Pongdong-ni, Tongch'ang-dong and Dongchong-ni are all the same northwest coastal launch facility infrastructures names while Musudan-ni is the east coast launch site.

References:

1. Charles P. Vick Wrote the Following: NK IR Policy issues: Sat 10/15/2011 11:10 AM, Thu. , 10/20/2011 9:10 AM private Communications:

2. N. Korea conducted missile engine test last year: sources, Yonhap news agency, Seoul, South Korea , July 24, 2011

3. N. Korea tested missile rocket: report AFP Seoul July 24, 2011 (again quoting the Yonhap news agency.)

4. englishnews@chosun.com., N. Korea Lays Train Tracks to New Missile Site, July 25, 2011 p. 1.

5. DPRK Pyongyang, radio announcement, March 16, 2012.

6. N. Korea seeking to develop nuclear missile: Seoul, AFT, March 19, 2012, p. 2 and How Can N. Korea Rocket Debris Be Retrieved? , The Chosun Ilbo, englishnews@chosun.com March 19, 2012.

7. http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/03/21/exclusive-north-koreas-expected-rocket-trajectory/

8. http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/03/16/north-korea-to-launch-satellite-in-april/

9. fpspace@www.friends-partners.org, [FPSPACE] Kwangmyongsong-3 attempt, Sven Grahn, 3/28/2012, 3:20 PM, Reference footnote #16 should be 3/28/2012 3:20 PM EDT, since the “Ursprungligt meddelande" posted below got shifted ahead to read UTC +2. 

10. --Original Message--, From: Ted Molczan, Sent: Friday, April 06, 2012 9:01 PM, To: Charles Vick, Subject: North Korean missile launch

11. --Original Message--, From: Ted Molczan, Sent: Friday, April 06, 2012 11:08 PM, To: 'Charles Vick', Subject: RE: North Korean missile launch

12. --Original Message--, From: Ted Molczan, Sent: Friday, April 06, 2012 11:42 PM, To: 'Charles Vick', Subject: RE: North Korean missile launch

13. --Original Message--, From: Ted Molczan, Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 3:26 AM, To: 'Charles Vick', Subject: RE: North Korean missile launch.

Hello Charles, Got back late, and decided to plot the various trajectories I discussed on a chart, which I have posted to SeeSat-L: http://satobs.org/seesat/Apr-2012/0083.html

14. VOA, By Steven Herman, Seoul, N. Korean Missile Announcement Considered A Slap to Diplomacy, March 22, 2012.

15. The Chosun Ilbo, N. Korean Rocket Launch ‘Long and Carefully Planned, englishnews@chosun.com/March 22, 2012 p.1.
16. Multiple press reports SKorea: Nkorea moves rocket to launch site Hyung-Jin Kim, Associated Press March 25, 2012 p.1, & others.

17. N. Korea Gets Rocket Ready for Launch, The Chosun Ilbo , http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/04/06/2012040600597.html , englishnews@chosun.com , Apr. 06, 2012, p. 1

18. Gertz, Bill, Pentagon activates missile defenses for North Korean launch, The Washington, Free beacon, http://freebeacon.com/red-alert/ , April 2, 2012 p. 1.

19.  Aegis destroyers keep eye on sky for North rocket South Korea, Japan, U.S. to deploy warships to monitor missile launch, Inside Korea JoongAng Ilbo Daily, http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2950948 , Apr 04, 2012

20. Gertz, Bill, North Korea making missile able to hit U.S. The Washington Times, Dec. 5, 2011. P. 1-4, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/5/north-korea-making-missile-able-to-hit-us/?page=all

21. Gertz, Bill, Inside The Ring: North Korea’s ICBM, The Washington Times, March 7, 2012, p. 1, http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/7/inside-the-ring-north-koreas-icbm/

22. N. Korea “Building Even Bigger Missile”, The Chosun Ilbo , http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/04/03/2012040300634.html, April 3, 2012, p. 1

23. http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070130-122437-6559r.htm Gertz, Bill, How the “axis” seeks the killer missile, The Washington Times, January 30, 2007, p. ?

24. “Rocket to cost North equivalent of feeding 19 mil. For one year”, Yonhap News Agency, Seoul, South Korea report, April 2, 2012, p. 1-2. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/04/02/0401000000AEN20120402004300315.HTML .

25. General reference & illustration sources:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/iran/simorgh-3-series.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/iran/images/irnk60.jpg|||

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/images/nkir-nkspacelv20915.jpg

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/td-2-3rd-flighttest.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/td-2-flighttest.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/td-2-second-flighttest.htmhttp://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/04/north-koreas-rocket-began-life-underwater/

26. N. Korea “Has 10,000 Missile Experts” The Chosun Ilbo, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/04/03/2012040301239.html , April 3, 2012, p.1.

27.  MIT Professor Theodore A. Postal & UCS, Dr. David Wright studies of Taep’o-dong -2, "A Technical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program", Theodore Postol, 2009-03-24,http://docs.ewi.info/JTA_TA_Program.pdf. This paper reviews both DPRK and Iranian missile developments.

28. Foreign journalist arrive in N. Korea to cover rocket launch, Yonhap News Agency , Seoul, South Korea, April 8, 2012, & Foreign Journalist, experts tour rocket launch site in N. Korea, Yonhap News Agency , Seoul, South Korea, April 9, 2012.

29. Champion, Gilles, Japan deploys missile batteries as North Korea prepares to launch long-range rocket, National Post, AFP, April 8, 2012 pp. 1-3

 

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